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The aim of this paper is to present a new logic, called LArs, for the abduction
of singular hypotheses. The intended application context of the logic concerns
problem solving situations in which one tries to ‘abduce’ an explanatory hypoth-
esis for an explanandum on the basis of a background theory possibly together
with some relevant empirical findings. The intended set of premises will thus
typically consist of one or more explananda and some general statements that,
with respect to those particular explananda, are considered as relevant. It may
also contain zero or more empirical findings that are relevant (for instance, be-
cause they contradict one of the explanantia).
The logic presented here is a variant of the logic LAr.1 Both LAr and LArs
are adaptive logics. Adaptive logics are a family of non-standard logics that
are meant to study defeasible reasoning processes in a formally exact way. As
will become clear below, the adaptive logics framework is especially suited to
formulate formal logics for abduction.2
The logics LAr and LArs lead to the same consequence set when applied to
the same set of premises. The difference, however, is that LArs, unlike LA
r, is
in the so-called “standard format” of adaptive logics.
Formulating an adaptive logic in standard format has many advantages. One
of them is that both the semantics and the proof theory can be formulated in a
∗Research for this paper was supported by subventions from Ghent University and from
the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO - Vlaanderen). The author is indebted to the
anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.
1The logic LAr was first presented in Joke Meheus and Diderik Batens, “A Formal Logic
for Abductive Reasoning”, in Logic Journal of the IGPL 14, 2006, pp. 221-236.
2The first logic in this family was designed around 1980 by Diderik Batens and was meant
to interpret (possibly) inconsistent theories as consistently as possible. Later the notion of
an adaptive logic was generalized in different ways (for instance, to capture ampliative forms
of reasoning, such as abduction and inductive generalization) and a whole variety of adap-
tive logics was designed—for an excellent introduction to adaptive logics see Diderik Batens,
Adaptive Logics and Dynamic Proofs. Mastering the Dynamics of Reasoning, with Special
Attention to Handling Inconsistency, forthcoming.
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completely generic way. A second, and more important advantage, is that the
standard format warrants that all central meta-theoretic properties (soundness,
completeness, proof invariance, fixed point property, . . . ) hold. As soon as it
can be shown that the adaptive logic satisfies the requirements of the standard
format, all these properties can be proven in a generic way (that is, without
referring to the properties of the specific adaptive logic). The standard format
will be discussed in Section 5.
A final advantage of LArs is that it is much more transparant and much more
user-friendly than LAr. One of the reasons for this is that, in LArs, it is not
required to determine beforehand the set of possible explanantia and the set of
possible explananda, which is a drawback of LAr.3
Both LAr and LArs are based on Classical Logic—henceforth CL. So, all
references to causality, laws of nature, and similar non-extensional concepts will
be out of the picture. I do not doubt that more interesting results may be
obtained from intensional logics. However, as a starting point, I want to keep
the discussion as simple and transparant as possible.
2 The problem
Many formal logicians display disinterest or even suspicion with respect to ab-
duction. There seem to be several reasons for this. The first is that abductive
steps are of the form
† (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α)), B(β) / A(β)
a fallacy known as Affirming the Consequent (given Universal Instantiation).
The second is that many examples of purportedly sound abductions seem to
rely on a hidden non-formal reasoning: the only sensible formal rule behind
them seems to lead inevitably to a set of unsound and even inconsistent conclu-
sions. For instance, given the explananda Qa and Ra and the generalizations
(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) and (∀x)(¬Px ⊃ Rx), (†) enables one to infer both Pa and
¬Pa. A third reason seems to be that abductive inferences are ‘contextually
validated’. For instance, although it makes sense to infer Pa on the basis of
{(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx), Qa, Qb∧¬Pb}, it does not make sense to infer Pb from that
same set of premises.
Still, mainly from the side of computer science, several attempts have been
made at formulating a logic-based approach to abduction.4 What these ap-
proaches have in common is that (†) is not implemented directly. Instead,
abductive inferences are specified as a kind of ‘backward reasoning’: given a
theory T and an explanandum B, find an A such that5
(1) T ∪ {A} ` B.
(2) T 6` B.
(3) T 6` ¬A.
3That both sets have to determined beforehand is one of the reasons that LAr is not in
standard format—see Section 5 for the requirements on the standard format.
4For an excellent introduction to logic-based approaches to abduction, see Atocha Aliseda,
Abductive Reasoning. Logical Investigations into Discovery and Explanation. Dordrecht:
Springer 2006.
5I use the notion “theory” here in a broad sense. It contains the background theory, but
may also contain empirical findings that are relevant for the explanation problem.
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(4) B 6` A.
(5) A is ‘minimal’.
The first of these requirements needs little explanation. Also the next two
requirements are straightforward: (2) warrants that the explanandum B is not
explained by the background theory, and (3) that the explanatory hypothesis
A is compatible with T .6 (4) is needed to rule out (partial) self-explanations.
For instance, we do not want to abduce B as an explanation for itself. Also, if
T ∪{A} ` B, then T ∪{A∨B} ` B, but we do not want A∨B as an explanation
for B. Cases like this are ruled out by requiring that the truth of the explanatory
hypothesis is not warranted by the truth of the explanandum—this is what (4)
comes to. (5) is related to the fact that, when trying to explain an explanandum,
one is interested in explanations that are as parsimonious as possible. Hence, in
view of (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α)) `CL (∀α)((A(α) ∧ C(α)) ⊃ B(α)), for an arbitrary
C, (the so-called property of strengthening the antecedent) one needs to prevent
that A(β)∧C(β) can be abduced, whenever A(β) can. This can be realized by
requiring that the explanatory hypothesis is ‘minimal’.
The notion of minimality can be defined in different ways. One may, for
instance, consider an explanatory hypothesis as minimal if no alternative is
available that is logically weaker and that also satisfies the requirements (1)–
(4). This is the option that is followed for the logic LArs.
The approach in the present paper is very different from the existing logic-
based approaches to abduction. As mentioned above, the logic LArs is an adap-
tive logic. Defining a logic for abduction within the adaptive logic framework
has several advantages. A first one is that the resulting logics (unlike the sys-
tems available today) have a proof theory. As we shall see below, this proof
theory is dynamic (conclusions derived at some stage may be rejected at a later
stage), but it warrants that the conclusions derived at a given stage are justified
in view of the insight in the premises at that stage. This is especially important
as, at the predicative level, abductive reasoning is not only undecidable, there
even is no positive test for it (see also Section 3).7
Another advantage of the proposed logics is that they are much closer to
natural reasoning than the existing systems. As we mentioned before, abduction
is usually viewed as a form of backward reasoning—“find an A that satisfies the
requirements (1)–(5)”. The search procedure by which this is realized in the
existing systems (for instance, some form of linear resolution) is very different
from the search procedures of human reasoners. The logic proposed in this paper
treats abduction as a form of ‘forward reasoning’: it is an ampliative system
that directly validates certain inferences of the form (†).
The third advantage is related to this: deductive and abductive steps are
nicely integrated into a single system. As a consequence, the logics not only
enable one to generate explanatory hypotheses, but also to infer predictions
on the basis of explanatory hypotheses and the background theory. This is
6A formula A is said to be compatible with a set of premises Γ iff Γ 6` ¬A.
7A property for objects of a given kind is decidable iff there is a mechanical procedure that
leads to the answer YES if the property holds and to the answer NO if the property does not
hold. There is a positive test for objects of a given kind iff there is a mechanical procedure that
leads to the answer YES if the property holds. If the property does not hold the procedure
may lead to the answer NO, but may continue forever. So, even if A follows abductively from a
theory T and an explanandum B, there need not exist any finite construction that establishes
this.
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highly important from the point of view of applications. In all interesting cases,
explanatory hypotheses are typically used to derive predictions which, in turn,
may lead to a revision of the original hypotheses.
A final advantage is that, unlike what is the case for the existing logic-based
approaches, LArs does not require that one determines beforehand the set of
potential explanations. This makes it a much more flexible tool, especially for
cases that involve ill-structured problems, where it may not be clear at all what
would count as an explanation.
3 Main Characteristics of Abductive Reasoning
In order to present the logic LArs, I shall first discuss in some more detail the
main characteristics of abductive reasoning processes.
As mentioned in the previous section, abductive inferences should lead to
conclusions that are compatible with the premises. It is important to note, how-
ever, that different explanantia are not necessarily jointly compatible with the
premises. None of the requirements (1)–(5) excludes that different explanations
are incompatible with each other. Evidently, this raises the question how one
can avoid, in a classical framework, that the generation of contradicting expla-
nations leads to triviality. We shall see below that this problem is handled in a
very natural way by the logic LArs.
A second characteristic is that abduction is a non-monotonic form of rea-
soning: conclusions that follow abductively from a theory T may be withdrawn
when T is extended to T ∪ T ′. This characteristic is related to the fact that
some of the requirements for abductive inferences are negative—see (2)–(4) in
the previous section.
To see the relation between the negative requirements and the non-monotonic
character of abductive inferences more clearly, consider the following simple ex-
ample:
(6) John has a fever and small red spots on his face and body.
(7) Everybody who has rubeola (the measles) has a fever and small red spots
on the face and body.
(8) Everybody who has rubella (the German measles) has a fever and small
red spots on the face and body.
(9) Nobody has rubeola more than once.
(10) Nobody has rubella more than once.
Suppose that (6) is the explanandum B, and that (7)–(10) consitute the back-
ground theory. From (7), we may derive by CL:
(11) If John has rubeola, then he has a fever and small red spots on his face
and body.
Hence, as requirements (1)–(5) are evidently fulfilled for (6), (7)–(10), and the
antecedent of (9), we may abduce
(12) John has rubeola.
Similarly, we may add on the basis of (8)
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(13) If John has rubella, then he has a fever and small red spots on his face
and body.
This in turn allows us to abduce
(14) John has rubella.
So, we derived two different explanantia for the same explanandum. However, if
we interpret a ‘minimal explanation’ as the logically weakest one, then neither
of the two explanantia satisfies this criterion, but their disjunction does. It is
easy to see how this disjunction may be derived in the proof. From (7) and (8)
follows
(15) Everybody who has rubeola or rubela has a fever and small red spots on
the face and body.
From this follows by CL
(16) If John has rubeola or rubela, then he has has a fever and small red spots
on his face and body.
But then, in view of (6) and (15) we may abduce
(17) John has rubeola or he has rubela.
In view of the disjunction of possible explanations on line (17), the explanations
on lines (12) and (14) are no longer minimal. In LArs, from line (17) on, lines
(12) and (14) are marked, indicating that the sentences that occur on them are
no longer considered as derived in the proof (see Sections 4 and 5 to see how
this marking is technically realized).
As was mentioned in the introduction, ampliative reasoning processes display
an interesting interaction between abductive steps and deductieve steps.
Suppose that we continue our previous proof with a relevant finding that we
just found out about John:
(18) John had rubeola last year.
But then, from (9) and (18) we may derive deductively
(19) John does not have rubeola.
And hence, in view of (17) and (19), we can rule out one of the potential
explanations, leaving us in this case with one potential explanation:
(17) John has rubela.
The final characteristic is that abductive reasoning processes, at the predica-
tive level, do not have a positive test. This is related to the fact that first-order
predicate logic is undecidable—if a conclusion A does not follow from a set of
premises Γ, we may not be able to establish this (see also footnote 7). Hence,
as abductive inferences are partly defined in terms of negative requirements, it
immediately follows that, for undecidable fragments of first-order logic, abduc-
tive inferences lack a positive test. Suppose, for instance, that for a theory T ,
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an explanandum B, and a sentence A, (1) is satisfied. In that case, it seems
reasonable to conclude that A follows abductively from T , provided that (2)–
(5) are satisfied. However, there is no algorithm to establish. Hence, if one is
unable to establish that (2)–(5) are satisfied, there is no absolute warrant that
the abductive step is not erroneous.
This brings us to the general idea behind our adaptive logic. In LArs it is
allowed that, as soon as soon as (1) is satisfied, an abductive step is made, but
on the condition that (2)–(5) are satisfied. In other words, for any possible
application of abduction, it is assumed, unless and until proven otherwise, that
the conditions (2)–(5) are satisfied. How this is realized technically will become
clear below. We shall end this section with a motivation for this general idea.
There are different ways to deal with the lack of a positive test. The most
common one is to consider only decidable fragments of first-order logic. The
rationale behind this is clear: when dealing with decidable fragments, one may
be sure that, for arbitrary theories T and explananda B, there is an algorithm
for (2)–(5), and hence, that a decision method can be designed for “follows
abductively from”. From the point of view of applications, however, this is an
unacceptable restriction: nearly all interesting theories are such that their set
of theorems is undecidable.
The alternative is to allow that inferences are made, not on the basis of
absolute warrants, but on the basis of one’s best insights in the premises. When
this second option is followed, abductive reasoning processes not only exhibit an
external form of dynamics (adding new information may lead to the withdrawal
of previously derived conclusions), but also an internal one (the withdrawal may
be caused by merely analysing the premises). Suppose, for instance, that for
a theory T , an explanandum B, and a sentence A, one establishes that (1) is
satisfied, and one did not establish that one of (2)–(5) is violated. In line with
the general idea from two paragraphs ago, we may consider A as an abductive
consequence of T . This conclusion, however, is provisional. If at a later moment
in time, one is able to show that one of the negative requirements is violated
(for instance, because one establishes that ¬A follows from T ), A has to be
withdrawn as an explanation for B.
There are several arguments in favour of this second option. The first is
that unwanted restrictions are avoided: abduction can be defined for any first-
order theory. A second argument is that the conclusions of abductive reasoning
processes are defeasible anyway. Whether the withdrawal of a conclusion is
caused by an external factor (by adding new premises) or by an internal one (by
gaining better insight in the premises) does not seem essential. The third, and
most important argument is that, even for decidable fragments of first-order
logic, it is often unrealistic to require absolute warrants. Even if a decision
method is available, reasoners may lack the resources to perform an extensive
search, and hence, may be forced to act on their present best insights.
The logic LArs follows this second option. This has the advantage that, even
for undecidable fragments of first-order logic, it enables one to come to justified
conclusions. These conclusions are tentative and may later be rejected, but they
constitute, given one’s insight in the premises at that moment, the best possible
estimate of the conclusions that are ‘finally derivable’ from the premises.8
8At this point, one may interpret “an abductive conclusion A is finally derivable from a
theory T” as “A satisfies the requirements (1)–(5)”—see Section 5 for a precise definition of
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4 Informal Presentation of the Logic LArs
The general idea behind LArs is extremely simple: given a set of premises Γ, it
is allowed that any valid inference rule of CL is applied (LArs is an adaptive
extension of CL), and moreover that (†) is applied “as much as possible”. For
the moment, this ambiguous phrase may be interpreted as “unless and until
(∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α)) ∧ (B(β) ∧ ¬A(β)) turns out to be CL-derivable from Γ”.
So, whenever it is CL-derivable from Γ that, for some general rule (∀α)(A(α) ⊃
B(α)) and some explanandum B(β), (†) cannot be applied consistently (because,
¬A(β) is CL-derivable from Γ), the application of (†) is overruled. In view of
what we have seen in Section 2 (requirement (3)), this is exactly what we want.
A formula of the form (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α))∧ (B(β)∧¬A(β)) will henceforth
be called an abnormality. It is a formula that blocks a desired inference (in this
case an abductive step). In line with what is common for adaptive logics, we
shall say that LArs interprets sets of premises “as normally as possible”. In this
case this means that abductive steps are “applied as much as possible”.9 To
keep the proofs below within limits, I shall use (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α))(α/β) as an
abbreviation for formulas of the form (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α)) ∧ (B(β) ∧ ¬A(β)).
In order to rule out (partial) self-explanations, we only need one refinement.
Given a formula (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α))(α/β), we shall require that A(β) does not
share any predicate with B(β). So, none of the following formulas counts as an
abnormality:
(∀x)(Px ⊃ Px) ∧ (Pa ∧ ¬Pa)
(∀x)((Px ∧Qx) ⊃ Px) ∧ ((Pa ∧Qa) ∧ ¬(Pa ∧Qa))
(∀x)((Px ∨Qx) ⊃ (Px ∨Rx)) ∧ ((Pa ∨Ra) ∧ ¬(Pa ∨Ra))
(∀x)((Px ∧Qx) ⊃ (Px ∧Rx)) ∧ ((Pa ∧Ra) ∧ ¬(Pa ∧Ra))
From now on, we shall only use the term “abnormality” for formulas of the form
(∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α))(α/β) that satisfy this additional requirement.
To realize the contextual validation of (†), we shall make a distinction in the
proof theory between unconditional rules and conditional rules. The uncondi-
tional rules are all those that are validated by CL. The conditional rules are
applications of (†). In order to avoid referring to a large set of specific rules,
and as is common for adaptive logics, I shall use two generic rules (see below for
illustrations and Section 5 for the precise definitions of the rules). The generic
rule for the unconditional rules is called RU, and the one for the conditional
rules RC.
Here is a very simple example of a proof in LArs. The fifth element in the
proof is the so-called condition—its function will become clear immediately.
1 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
2 (∀x)(¬Px ⊃ Rx) PREM ∅
3 (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Tx) PREM ∅
4 (∀x)(Sx ⊃ V x) PREM ∅
5 (∀x)(Wx ⊃ ¬Sx) PREM ∅
6 Qa ∧Ra PREM ∅
the notion of final derivability.
9The term “abnormality” is a technical term that is common in the literature on adaptive
logics and that is application dependent. It does not refer to any standard of normality.
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7 Ta ∧ Tb PREM ∅
8 Wa PREM ∅
The formulas on lines 1–5 correspond to the background theory; those on lines
6–8 to explananda. In view of the formulas on lines 1 and 6 we may derive
9 Pa 1,6; RC {(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)(x/a)}
Note that the formula Pa ∨ (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)(x/a) is CL-derivable from the
premises.10 Hence, one may read the latter formula as: Pa is derivable from
the premises provided (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)(x/a) is false. This is why it is allowed in
the adaptive proof that Pa is derived on the condition {(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)(x/a)}.
The underlying idea is that abnormalities are supposed to be false, unless and
until proven otherwise. If at some stage the condition of line 9 is no longer
satisfied, the line is marked and the formula that occurs on that line is no
longer considered as derived. The addition of “RC” in the justification refers to
the fact that this line was added by the generic conditional rule.
Note also that potential explanations will always be introduced on a non-
empty condition. This provides an easy way to distinguish, in the proof, between
CL-consequences of the theory and potential explanations.
In view of the formulas on lines 2 and 6, we may continue the proof as follows
10 ¬Pa 2,6; RC {(∀x)(¬Px ⊃ Rx)(x/a)}
This brings us immediately to a slight complication, that is best dealt with first.
From the premises, neither (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)(x/a) nor (∀x)(¬Px ⊃ Rx)(x/a) is
CL-derivable. However, their disjunction is:
11 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)(x/a) ∨ (∀x)(¬Px ⊃ Rx)(x/a) 1,2,6; RU ∅
The information we obtain from the formula on line 11 is that, in view of
the premises, one of the abnormalities (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)(x/a) and (∀x)(¬Px ⊃
Rx)(x/a) is true. However, at this stage of the proof, we do not know which
one is. Another way to put this is that, in view of the premises, there is no
reason to choose one abnormality above the other, and hence, also no reason to
choose the explanatory hypothesis Pa above the hypothesis ¬Pa.
It is in view of cases like this that a strategy is needed to disambiguate the
phrase “to interpret the premises as normally as possible”. The strategy that is
followed in the case of LArs is the so-called Reliability Strategy. This requires
some definitions and conventions on notation.
Where ∆ is a finite set of abnormalities, the disjunction
∨
(∆) will be called
a Dab-formula and will be written as Dab(∆). A Dab-formula Dab(∆) will be
called a minimal Dab-formula at stage s of a proof, if, at that stage of the
proof, no Dab(∆′) is derived, such that ∆′ ⊂ ∆. As will become clear below,
the marking of lines at a stage s of a proof will proceed in terms of the minimal
Dab-formulas that are derived at that stage of the proof.
What the Reliability Strategy comes to is that, whenever a minimal Dab-
formula is derived in the proof at a certain stage (as is the case on line 11 of
10I say that a formula A is derived in a proof from Γ if A occurs on some unmarked line
in the proof. I say that a formula A is derivable from Γ if there exists a proof from Γ such
that A occurs on an unmarked line in it. In Section 5, we shall see the precise definitions for
derived at a stage, finally derived at a stage and finally derivable.
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our proof), then all disjuncts that occur in that Dab-formula are considered as
unreliable, and hence, all lines that rely on the normal behaviour of any of these
disjuncts are marked. Or, put differently, a line is marked at a stage s if its
condition contains an abnormality that is a disjunct of a miminal Dab-formula
at that stage. In our proof, this means that both lines 9 and 10 are marked from
stage 11 on and the formulas that occur on these lines are no longer considered
as derived in the proof. This is precisely what we want, because we want our
set of explanantia to be jointly compatible with the premises. This is how the
proof looks at stage 11:
1 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) PREM ∅
2 (∀x)(¬Px ⊃ Rx) PREM ∅
3 (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Tx) PREM ∅
4 (∀x)(Sx ⊃ V x) PREM ∅
5 (∀x)(Wx ⊃ ¬Sx) PREM ∅
6 Qa ∧Ra PREM ∅
7 Ta ∧ Tb PREM ∅
8 Wa PREM ∅
9 Pa 1,6; RC {(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)(x/a)} X11
10 ¬Pa 2,6; RC {(∀x)(¬Px ⊃ Rx)(x/a)} X11
11 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)(x/a)∨ 1,2,6; RU ∅
(∀x)(¬Px ⊃ Rx)(x/a)
The following extension of the proof illustrates the way in which abductive
steps are contextually validated in LArs. Suppose that we continue the proof as
follows
12 Sa 3,7; RC {(∀x)(Sx ⊃ Tx)(x/a)}
13 Sb 3,7; RC {(∀x)(Sx ⊃ Tx)(x/b)}
However, the following line may be added by the rule RU:
14 ¬Sa 5,8; RU ∅
At this point it becomes clear that the following abnormality is CL-derivable
15 (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Tx)(x/a) 3,7,14; RU ∅
From this point on, the condition of line 12 overlaps with the minimal Dab-
formula on line 15, and hence, this line is marked:
. . .
12 Sa 3,7; RC {(∀x)(Sx ⊃ Tx)(x/a)} X15
13 Sb 3,7; RC {(∀x)(Sx ⊃ Tx)(x/b)}
14 ¬Sa 4,5; RU ∅
15 (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Tx)(x/a) 3,7,14; RU ∅
Despite the fact that Sa cannot be abduced on the basis of lines 3 and 7, Sb
can be abduced on the basis of these same lines. For this simple example, it is
easy to check that line 15 will not be marked in any extension of the proof (Sb
is finally derived in this proof—see Section 5 for the precise definition of final
derivability).
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This is also a good point to illustrate how abductive steps and deductive
steps are nicely integrated in LArs. In view of lines 4 and 13, the following line
may be added:
16 V b 4,13; RU {(∀x)(Sx ⊃ Tx)(x/b)}
The formula on line 16 is a prediction that is CL-derivable from the premises
and the explanatory hypothesis on line 13. The line is added by the generic
unconditional rule RU. Note that when the unconditional rule is applied, no
new formulas are added to the condition, but any formula that occurs in a
non-empty condition is ‘carried’ over to the conclusion of the application. The
reason for this is easy to understand. If, at some point, line 13 has to be
marked (because its condition is no longer satisfied), then evidently any line
that depends on it, should also be marked.
I shall now show that the logic LArs has some further desired properties. The
first is that no logically contingent formula is finally derivable as an explanation
for a tautology. Suppose that we would start a proof by introducing two CL-
theorems:
1 Pa ∨ ¬Pa RU ∅
2 (∀x)(Qx ⊃ (Px ∨ ¬Px)) RU ∅
We may now continue the proof as follows
3 Qa RU {(∀x)(Qx ⊃ (Px ∨ ¬Px))(x/a)}
However, this is harmless. As soon as we add the following line:
4 (∀x)(Qx ⊃ (Px ∨ ¬Px))(x/a) ∨ (∀x)(¬Qx ⊃ (Px ∨ ¬Px))(x/a) RU ∅
line 3 is marked.
There is also no risk that contradictions would be (finally) abducible for
logically contingent formulas. Suppose that our explanandum is Qa and that
we introduce the CL-theorem (∀x)((Px ∧ ¬Px) ⊃ Qx) in our proof:
1 Qa PREM ∅
2 (∀x)((Px ∧ ¬Px) ⊃ Qx) RU ∅
We may now abduce Pa∧¬Pa as an explanation for Qa, but this line is marked
as soon as we unconditionally derive (∀x)((Px ∧ ¬Px) ⊃ Qx)(x/a) from Qa in
the proof:
3 Pa ∧ ¬Pa 1,2; RC {(∀x)((Px ∧ ¬Px) ⊃ Qx)(x/a)} X4
4 (∀x)((Px ∧ ¬Px) ⊃ Qx)(x/a) 1; RU ∅
The derivation of (partial) self-explanations is ruled out by the restriction
that we have imposed upon our abnormalities. Consider the following proof,
where Pa is our explanandum
1 Pa PREM ∅
2 (∀x)((Px ∨Qx) ⊃ Px) PREM ∅
Evidently, we may extend the proof by
10
3 (Pa ∨Qa) ∨ ((∀x)((Px ∨Qx) ⊃ Px)(x/a)) 1; RU ∅
However, in this case, the derivation of line 3 will not allow us to derive Pa ∨
Qa on the condition (∀x)((Px ∨ Qx) ⊃ Px)(x/a). The reason is that the
latter formula is not an abnormality and that the condition may only contain
abnormalities (see the next section for the precise definitions). (The formula
Pa ∨ Qa could evidently be derived on the empty condition by the rule RU
from the formula on line 1, but this is obviously harmless. As was mentioned
above, only formulas that are derived on non-empty conditions are considered
as possible explanations for some explanandum.)
There is one last complication we have to address. What if more than one
explanans is abducible for the same explanandum? Consider, for instance, the
following proof:
1 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) PREM ∅
2 (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) PREM ∅
3 Ra PREM ∅
4 Pa 1,3; RC {(∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)(x/a)}
5 Qa 2,3; RC {(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)(x/a)}
From these premises, the following minimal Dab-formulas
6 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)(x/a) ∨ (∀x)((Qx ∧ ¬Px) ⊃ Rx)(x/a) 1–3; RU ∅
7 (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)(x/a) ∨ (∀x)((Px ∧ ¬Qx) ⊃ Rx)(x/a) 1–3; RU ∅
are CL-derivable. This means that, by the Reliability Strategy, both lines 4 and
5 are marked. Hence, as lines 4 and 5 will remain marked in any extension of the
proof, neither Pa nor Qa is finally derivable from these premises.11 However,
their disjunction is, as is shown by the following extension:
8 (∀x)((Px ∨Qx) ⊃ Rx) 1,2; RU ∅
9 Pa ∨Qa 3,8; RC {(∀x)((Px ∨Qx) ⊃ Rx)(x/a)}
As no minimal Dab-formula is derivable from the premises that has (∀x)((Px∨
Qx) ⊃ Rx)(x/a) as one of its disjuncts, the formula on line 9 is finally derived
in this proof.
Before ending this section, I want to illustrate that LArs leads to the most
parsimonious explanatory hypotheses. Consider the following example:
1 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) PREM ∅
2 (∀x)((Px ∧Qx) ⊃ Rx) PREM ∅
3 Ra PREM ∅
At this stage both Pa and Pa ∧Qa may be abduced:
4 Pa 1,3; RU (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)(x/a)
5 Pa ∧Qa 2,3; RU (∀x)((Px ∧Qx) ⊃ Rx)(x/a)
11The only way in which lines 4 and 5 would be unmarked in some extension is when the
Dab-formulas on lines 6 and 7 are no longer minimal. However, for this simple example, it
is easily seen that neither of the disjuncts of the formula on line 6 is CL-derivable from the
premises and analogously for the formula on line 7.
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However, line 5 is marked as soon as the following minimal Dab-formula is
derived
6 (∀x)((Px ∧Qx) ⊃ Rx)(x/a) ∨ (∀x)((Px ∧ ¬Qx) ⊃ Rx)(x/a) 1; RU ∅
I end this section with a possible objection. Some readers might object
that, given a generalization of the form (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α)), the logic LArs
cannot distinguish between cases in which nearly all B are also A and cases in
which very few B are A. In the former case, the argument might continue, an
application of abduction for a particular explanandum seems sound (it leads to
a sufficiently plausible hypothesis), whereas it does not seem sound in the latter
case.
My reaction to this objection is twofold. The first is that, in cases where
there are two or more possible explanations for the same explanandum, only
their disjunction is LArs-derivable. So, the plausibility of the (disjunctions of)
possible explanations that are LArs-derivable are at least as plausible as their
most plausible disjunct. The second reaction is that the objection seems to rely
on a confusion. The aim of LArs is not to select those explanantia that are most
plausible. Its aim is to derive, for each explanandum, a unique disjunction of
possible explanations that is complete (also the most unlikely ones occur in it).
For certain application contexts, where it is crucial not to overlook any of the
possibilities, this procedure makes good sense.
5 The Logic LArs
In this section, I present the logic LArs in a formally precise way. As any other
adaptive logic in standard format, the logic LArs is characterized by a triple: a
lower limit logic (a reflexive, transitive, monotonic, uniform, and compact logic
for which there is a positive test), a set of abnormalities Ω (characterized by a,
possibly restricted, logical form) and a strategy. The lower limit logic is the logic
that determines the stable part of the adaptive logic, and that also determines
the unconditional rule. In the case of LArs, the lower limit logic is CL and the
strategy is Reliability.
Relying on the previously introduced abbreviation, the set of abnormalities
Ω is defined by
Definition 1 Ω = {(∀α)((A(α) ⊃ B(α))(α/β) | no predicate that occurs in
B(β) occurs in A(β)}
In order to define the semantics, we need some further definitions. We first
define the abnormal part of a CL-model:
Definition 2 Ab(M) = {A ∈ Ω |M  A}
We shall say that a Dab-formula Dab(∆) is a Dab-consequence of Γ if it is CL-
derivable from Γ and that it is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ if there is no
∆′ ⊂ ∆ such that Dab(∆′) is also a Dab-consequence of Γ. The set of formulas
that are unreliable with respect to Γ, denoted by U(Γ), is defined by
Definition 3 Where Dab(∆1), Dab(∆2), . . . are the minimal Dab-consequences
of Γ, U(Γ) = ∆1∪∆2∪ . . . is the set of formulas that are unreliable with respect
to Γ.
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In view of these definitions, the semantic consequence relation of LArs is given
by:
Definition 4 A CL-model M of Γ is reliable iff Ab(M) ⊆ U(Γ).
Definition 5 Γ LArs A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ.
As is common for all adaptive logics in standard format, the proof theory of
LArs is characterized by three generic inference rules and a marking definition.
The inference rules only refer to the lower limit logic, in our case CL. Where Γ
is the set of premises, the inference rules are given by
PREM If A ∈ Γ: . . . . . .
A ∅
RU If A1, . . . , An `CL B: A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n
RC If A1, . . . , An `CL B ∨Dab(Θ) A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n ∪Θ
The premise rule PREM simply states that, at any line of a proof, a premise
may be introduced on the empty condition. What the unconditional rule RU
comes to is that, whenever , A1, . . . , An `CL B and the A1, . . . , An occur in the
proof on the conditions ∆1, . . . ,∆n, then B may be added to the proof on the
condition ∆1∪ . . .∪∆n. The conditional rule RC is analogous, except that here
a new condition is introduced.
The marking definition proceeds in terms of the minimal Dab-formulas de-
rived at a stage of the proof:
Definition 6 Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula at stage s iff, at stage s,
Dab(∆) is derived on condition ∅, and no Dab(∆′) with ∆′ ⊂ ∆ is derived
on condition ∅.
Definition 7 Where Dab(∆1), . . . , Dab(∆n) are the minimal Dab-formulas
derived on condition ∅ at stage s, Us(Γ) = ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n.
Definition 8 Where ∆ is the condition of line i, line i is marked at stage s iff
∆ ∩ Us(Γ) 6= ∅.
A formula A is said to be derived at stage s of a proof if it occurs on a line
in the proof that is unmarked at stage s. As the marking proceeds in terms of
the minimal Dab-formulas that are derived at a certain stage, it is clear that
marking is a dynamic matter: a line may be unmarked at a stage s, marked at
a later stage s′ and again unmarked at an even later stage s′′. This is why a
more stable notion of derivability is needed:
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Definition 9 A is finally derived from Γ at line i of a proof at stage s iff A is
derived at line i at stage s, line i is unmarked at stage s, and every extension
of the proof in which line i is marked has a further extension in which i is
unmarked.
As may be expected, the derivability relation of LArs is defined with respect
to the notion of final derivability
Definition 10 Γ `LArs A (A is finally derivable from Γ) iff A is finally derived
in an LArs-proof from Γ.
The fact that LArs is in standard format immediately warrants that it has
all interesting meta-theoretic properties, such as soundness and completeness
and proof invariance:12
Theorem 1 Γ `LArs A iff Γ LArs A.
Theorem 2 If Γ `LArs A, then every LArs-proof from Γ can be extended in such
a way that A is finally derived in it.
6 Conclusion and open problems
In this paper, I presented the logic LArs for the abduction of singular hypotheses.
Despite some unusual properties (such as its dynamical character), LArs is a
decent formal logic, with a nice proof theory and a (preferential) semantics
that is sound and complete with respect to it. Several extensions and variants
are possible for the logic LArs. One that first comes to mind is a variant that
allows for the abduction of different explanatory hypotheses in cases where more
than one explanans is available for the same explanandum. (In such cases, LArs
only allows for the derivation of their disjunctions.) Other alternatives may be
obtained by changing the extensional framework of LArs into one that allows,
for instance, for a causal implication. It would also be interesting to explore
alternatives in which different explanatory hypotheses do not necessarily have
the same weight. Finally, it might be interesting to work on the heuristics behind
abductive processes. The logic LArs simply determines which explanantia follow
in view of an explanandum and a background theory. But, evidently, looking
for an (interesting) explanation is a goal-directed process. All this goes beyond
the scope of the logic presented in this paper. Still, it seems like an excellent
starting point to explore these questions further.
12I refer to Diderik Batens, Ibid., for an overview of the meta-theoretic properties and for
their proofs.
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